FID-070
Contextual Integrity and Prompt-Injection Resilience for Faith-Facing Agents
When a faith-facing agent reads email, web pages, agendas, documents, knowledge bases, and service requests, how can it distinguish authorized institutional instruction from untrusted context that attempts to redirect its behavior, exfiltrate information, or induce an unsafe action?
Why this matters
The question behind the brief.
Faith-facing systems may encounter pastoral notes, prayer requests, educational materials, institutional policies, and communications involving vulnerable people. In an agentic system, apparently ordinary content can also become an adversarial instruction. A system that treats an external webpage, forwarded message, or retrieved document as permission to act can violate confidentiality, misrepresent institutional authority, or cause harm while appearing helpful.
Metadata
How to place this idea.
Ways to help
Move this from question to evidence.
Develop synthetic attack scenarios, secure agent harnesses, and benchmark metrics.
Review context-integrity assumptions from security, privacy, and institutional operations perspectives.
Test defenses against both adversarial and legitimate high-trust workflows.
Contribute responsible disclosure and evaluation-reporting practices.
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